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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
law. In any other case where the defendant undertakes to raise the
question as to the correctness of the sheriff's return by an answer
in abatement it would seem that sound policy requires that the
Bartley case be followed.
It is open to the defendant to persuade the sheriff that he has
made a mistake, in which instance the sheriff would be privileged
to file an amended return which would dispose of the question. Walker
v. Shelbyville & R. T. Co., 80 Ind. 452 (1882). In view of the fact
that he is liable to the defendant for a "false" return, even although
onestly made, Diedreich v. Lauenstein, supra, this procedure normally
would be effective.
The real difficulty in the cases involving a false return as to
a service at the defendant's last and usual place of residence arises
out of the Indiana provision on this subject which frequently re-
suits in an unconstitutional service of process. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.),
c. 38, Sec. 56, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) Sec. 2-803 provides simply
that service of summons on a defendant may be had ". . . by leaving
a copy thereof at his usual or last place of residence." While it is
settled that service at the last and usual place of residence is a con-
stitutional substitute for personal service, Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind.
429 (1861), it is likewise settled that service of this character is
invalid if in its application it cannot reasonably be expected to give
actual notice to the defendant. This, the simple leaving of a sum-
mons at the home of a defendant from which he and his family are
temporarily absent is not due process of law, and a default judgment
based upon such service is subject to collateral attack on federal
constitutional grounds. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503 (1895); Mc-
Donald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1916). (The latter case involved service
by publication, but the language of the opinion supports the proposition
that any substitute for personal service can only be sustained when it
is the best available under the circumstances, and only when it
reasonably calculated to bring actual notice to the defendant). A
valid provision on this subject necessarily involves the acceptance of
the Federal Rule, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 4(d), and requires
that the summons be left ". .. with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein . . .", thus prohibiting the leaving
of the summons at the residence when it is in fact unoccupied.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
WAS MIDDLEMAN AN AGENT OR AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR?
Appellant sawmill operator brought this appeal from an in-
dustrial board order awarding compensation to appellee timber cutter
under the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act., Held, reversed.
Appellee was not an employee of the appellant for purposes of work-
men's compensation, although he was hired by a timber scalper




who in turn was employed by the appellant. Eley et al. v. Benedict,
Ind. App. - , 46 N.E. (2d) 492 (1943).
The majority of cases interpreting the workmen's compensation
act quite uniformily hold that the provisions of the act are to be
liberally constructed so as to achieve the social purposes for which
the act was enacted.2
By reason of the principle of liberal construction of the act, any
doubt existing as to its applicability may be presumed to be in favor
of the claimant3
The court in the instant case detoured from the general rule:
namely, that it should not weigh the evidence procured at the hearing
of the industrial board, and that only when there is no evidence to
sustain the facts found by the industrial board upon which the award
is based will such award be set aside by the appellate court,4 or by
the supreme court.5 If there be any evidence "... which by a reason-
able inference would tend to support the verdict [award] . . . this
court cannot reverse.. .26
The court stated, however, that it was "... unable to discover
any evidence which justifies the finding of the Industrial Board .... "I
But the record indicates that an agency relationship existed between
the appellant and the timber scalper-employer of the appellee.8 Thus
2. Kunkler v. Mauck, 108 Ind. App. 98, 27 N.E. (2d) 97 (1939);
Union Hospital v. S. P. Brown & Co., 104 Ind. App. 430, 11 N.E.(2d) 520 (1937); Cunya v. Vance, 100 Ind. App. 687, 197 N.E.
1737 (1935); Trustees of Indiana University v. Rush, 99 Ind. App.
203, 192 N.E. 111 (1934); Czuczko et al. v. Golden-Gary Co.,
Inc., 94 Ind. App. 47, 177 N.E. 466 (1931).
3. Meek v. Julian, 219 Ind. 83, 36 N.E. (2d) 854 (1941); J. P. 0.
Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Papadopoulos, 105 Ind. App. 165, 13 N.E.
(2d) 869 (1938); Domer v. Castator, 82 Ind. App. 574, 146 N.E.
881 (1924).
4. Hart, Schaffner & Marx v. Campbell, 110 Ind. App. 312, 38 N.E.(2d) 895 (1942); Studebaker Corp. v. Jones, 104 Ind. App. 270,
10 N.E. (2d) 747 (1937); Fritts v. Linton-Sunmit Coal Co., 101
Ind. App. 339, 197 N.E. 720 (1935); Castleman v. Eaves, 97 Ind.
App. 363, 186 N.E. 904 (1933).
5. The supreme court held in the case of Warren v. Indiana Tele-
phone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 114-115, 26 N.E. (2d) c,99, 408 (1940),
that a workmen's compensation case could be presented to the
supreme court for review by following the statutory procedure
for transferring cases from the appellate court to the supreme
court. This might be done, the court said in effect, notwith-
standing the fact that § 61 of the acts of 1929, c. 172 [Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1512] provided for an appeal to
the appellate court alone. The Warren v. Indiana Telephone
Company decision was followed in Loucks v. Diamond Chain &
Mfg. Co., 218 Ind. 244, 32 N.E. (2d) 308 (1941).
6. See Judge Royse, dissenting in the instant case at 494. Accord,
Colgate-Palmolive Peet Co. v. Setliff, 98 Ind. App. 577, 189 N.E.
396 (1934); Haskell v. Barker Car Co., 67 Ind. App. 178, 117
N.E. 555 (1918); Columbia School Supply Co. v. Lewis, 63 Ind.
App. 386, 115 N.E. 103 (1916).
7. Instant case at 494.
8. (a) First, there was a contract made by the timber scalper with
an owner of E.-d where timber was to be cut; the contract was
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it would seem that the court should have affirmed the award of the
industrial board since the appellee, hired by the appellant's agent, was
obviously injured in the course of the appellants employment.
At the outset, if one concedes that a liberal construction of the
workmen's compensation act was adhered to, that there was no
evidence to justify the industrial board's finding, and that the timber
scalper was an independent contractor and not an agent; it is difficult
to understand the decision in as much as the appellant did not comply
with the statutory provision 9 which required him to obtain from the
made for and in behalf of the appellant and the wording ex-
pressly established the scalper as agent for the appellant. See
the instant case at 493, 495. Such a contract gave the appellant
the benefits to be derived, but by the court's holding, the appellant
was relieved from any of the responsibilities arising there-
under-specifically, the liability for injury to an employee cutting
the timber which was the subject-matter of the contract. (b)
Second, in several instances the appellee and other cutters were
paid their wages directly by the appellant; in other cases, the
timber scalper traveled to the appellant's place of business to
obtain the funds with which to pay the appellee and the others.
See the instant case at 495. This mode of payment might easily
supply the inference that the appellee was an employee of the
appellant or that the scalper was an agent of the appellant.
(c) Third, the appellant advanced money to the scalper, such
credits being charged to his account. Since the scalper had no
money nor equipment of his own, such advances were customary;
yet the court held that the appellant exercised no control over
the scalper's dealings. See the instant case at 493. To establish
this lack of control one may assume that the scalper had free
reign over the money so advanced, that he had plentiful resources
at his fingers' touch, and that he had unlimted purposes for
which he could use the money-but this appears untenable in
light of the scalper's business position. (d) Last, the business
engaged in by the timber scalper was clearly a function essential
to the furtherance of the appellant's saw-mill operations. This
would indicate that the occupation of the scalper was not one
distinct and separate from that of the appellant; the question
of occupation is commonly used as one test of whether one is a
servant or independent contractor, and when it can be answered
that the occupation was not distinct and separate from that of
the employer, it is held that the workman is a servant and not
an independent contractor. Restatement, "Agency" (1933) § 220.
Furthermore, if any doubt exists as to whether one is an employee
or independent contractor, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of
being an employee. Meek v. Julian, 219 Ind. 83, 36 N.E. (2d)
854 (1941); Domer v. Castator, 82 Ind. App. 574, 146 N.E. 881
(1924).
9. Acts 1929, c. 172, § 14, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1214
which provides in part: ". . . any corporation, partnership, or
person [appellant], contracting for the performance of any
work by a contractor [timber scalper] subject to the compensa-
tion provisions of this act without exacting from such -con-
tractor a certificate from the industrial board showing that such
contractor has complied with . . . this act, shall be liable to the
same extent as the contractor for compensation . . . on account
of the injury or death of any employee [appellee] of such con-
tractor, due to an accident arising out of and in the course of
the performance of the work covered by such contract."
NOTES AND COMMENTS
timber scalper-independent contractor a certificate showing that the
latter was complying with the act. In the absence of this certificate
the appellant, as principal employer, would be liable for the injuries
sustained by the appellee.'0 In the case of Moore et al. v. Copeland,' 1
Heidenreich (comparable to the appellant) contracted with Moore
(comparable to the timber scalper) for the performanco of work with-
out having obtained from Moore an employer's certificate issued by the
industrial board. Moore hired Copeland (comparable to the appellee)
to do some of the work and the latter was injured hi the course of
this employment. The court held that Heidenreich, who failed to
exact the certificate, " . . . is also liable . . . for compensation."12
This case appears to be "on all fours" with the instant case.
Had the violation by the appellant been of art administrative
regulation of the industrial board rather than of a statute, the
court would say that this was not negligence per se and that
the appellant was not liable since the industrial board did not
have the authority to make law. Town of Kirklin et al. v. Ever-
man, 217 Ind. 683, 693, 28 N.E. (2d) 73, on rehearing, 29 N.E.
206 (1940); Sutherland, "Statutes and Statutorj Construction"
(Horack's ed. 1943) § 4003.
10. Freund et al. v. Allen et al., 98 Ind. App. 660, 184 N.E. 421
(1933); Makeever et al. v. Marlin et al., 92 Ind. App. 158, 174
N.E. 517 (1931); Moore et al. v. Smiley, 88 Ind. App. 703, 163
N.E. 235 (1928); Moore et al. v. Copeland, 88 Ird. App. 54, 163
N.E. 235 (1928); Chicago & Erie R. R. v. Kaufman et al., 78
Ind. App. 474, 133 N.E. 399 (1921).
11. 88 Ind. App. 54, 163 N.E. 235 (1928).
12. Id. at 56, 163 N.E. 235.
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